

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 SS-20 INR-10 NSC-07 CIAE-00

RSC-01 DRC-01 /084 W

----- 016310

R 191844Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2083

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T VIENNA 2458

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: ASSURANCES ON EUROPEAN FORCE REDUCTIONS

REF: USNATO 1358

1. WE WELCOME USNATO'S USEFUL SUGGESTION IN REFTEL. THE CONCEPTS IN PARA 6B3 ARE WORTH FURTHER EXPLORATION ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THAT IT MIGHT BE MORE ADVANTAGEOUS FOR NATO TO SEEK AN OVERALL CEILING FOR ALL NATO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER INCLUDING THE US. IF SO, THE COMMITMENT MIGHT HAVE TO BE A COLLECTIVE ONE OF US AND OTHER NATO MEMBERS. ALTHOUGH A THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO MAKE A CASE FOR KEEPING SUCH A COMMITMENT OUTSIDE THE TEXT OF OUR AGREEMENT. WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO FOCUS FUTURE DISCUSSION OF THIS TOPIC RATHER SPECIFICALLY ON THE IDEA OF A LIMITATION ON INCREASES IN MANPOWER FOR SAKE OF CONCEPTUAL CLARITY IN ORDER TO AVOID GETTING INTO PROBLEMS OF OVERALL FORCE FREEZE COVERING EQUIPMENT WITH ADVERSE POTENTIAL EFFECTS LATTER CONCEPT COULD HAVE ON

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FORCE IMPROVEMENTS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF ALLIED FORCE

POSTURE.

2. SOME PORTIONS OF THE APPROACH DESCRIBED IN REFTEL APPEAR TO BE BASED ON SOME OVERLAPPING OF TERMS WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET INTERESTS WITH WHICH WE ARE TRYING TO DEAL IN THIS ASPECT OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.

3. THE CONCEPTS OF A "FIXED PERIOD OF TIME" AND THE "LINK BETWEEN THE PHASES" ARE WAYS OF REFERRING TO CERTAIN CONCEPTS WHICH MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN THOSE PROVISIONS OF A POTENTIAL PHASE I AGREEMENT DESIGNED TO DEAL WITH SOVIET INTERESTS CONCERNING EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE ENTIRE REDUCTION PROCESS. TO EXTENT EAST HAS BEEN WILLING AT ALL TO DISCUSS ALLIED TWO-PHASE PROPOSAL, THE EAST WISHES TO KNOW SPECIFICALLY THAT ALL WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS, PARTICULARLY THE FRG, WILL PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS, HOW MUCH THEY WILL PARTICIPATE, AND THAT THEY WILL IN FACT PARTICIPATE, THAT IS, THAT A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS ACCORDING TO THE ALLIED APPROACH WILL HAVE A REAL OUTCOME.

4. IT CAN ALSO BE ASSUMED THAT ONE OF THE MAJOR EASTERN INTERESTS WITH REGARD TO THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IS TO PLACE A CEILING OF UNLIMITED DURATION ON WESTERN EUROPEAN AND ESPECIALLY FRG FORCES, BOTH AS REGARDS MANPOWER AND ARMAMENTS, ESPECIALLY NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS. HOWEVER, THE "FREEZE" CONCEPT IN THE FORM WE HAVE SUGGESTED, A GROUND FORCE MANPOWER LIMITATION AGREEMENT OF LIMITED DURATION, IS DESIGNED TO ADDRESS ONLY ONE SPECIFIC ASPECT OF EASTERN INTEREST, WHAT THE WESTERN EUROPEANS WILL DO AS REGARDS MANPOWER STRENGTH BETWEEN TWO PHASES OF NEGOTIATION ALONG THE LINES OF THE ALLIED CONCEPT.

5. BECAUSE OF ITS SPECIFIC NATURE AND TIME LIMITATION, THE "FREEZE" CONCEPT DOES NOT MEET THE MAJOR INTEREST OF THE EAST SPECIFIED ABOVE, NOR DOES IT

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SEEK TO DO SO. THEREFORE, ALTHOUGH USEFUL AS AN INDUCEMENT FOR THE EAST, IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT IN ITSELF TO GAIN EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, AS IMPLIED IN THE SUMMARY AND PARA 6 (A) OF THE REFTEL. ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING, WHICH WOULD COMMIT THE EAST TO MUCH LARGER REDUCTIONS THAN THE WEST, IS A DIFFERENT ISSUE FROM GAINING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO DEFER WESTERN EUROPEAN

REDUCTIONS TO A SECOND STAGE OF NEGOTIATION.

6. GIVEN THE GENERAL APPROACH SUGGEST IN VIENNA 1656, AND WITH THE SAME OBJECTIVE OF RETAINING MAXIMUM FREEDOM OF DECISION FOR THE USG, DISCUSSION IN BRUSSELS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A "FREEZE" WOULD APPEAR TO BE TAKING THE RIGHT GENERAL FORM. THAT IS TO SAY, THE SUBJECT IS UNDER ACTIVE DISCUSSION FROM VARIOUS VIEWPOINTS, SO THAT NATO DELEGATIONS ARE FAMILIAR WITH IT AND PREPARED TO REACH DECISIONS, BUT NO ADVANCE DECISIONS ARE BEING TAKEN WHICH WOULD NARROW THE FREEDOM OF DECISION OF THE USG OR IMPEDE THE NEGOTIATIONS.

7. SUCH A FORM OF DISCUSSION OF A POSSIBLE "FREEZE" IS USEFUL AND SHOULD, WE BELIEVE, BE PURSUED. BUT IT SHOULD NOT BE BORADENED TO COVER THE ENTIRE ISSUE OF ASSURANCES ABOUT EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN PHASE II, WHICH IS A MUCH WIDER SUBJECT INVOLVING MORE DIFFICULT ISSUES THAN A POSSIBLE FREEZE.

8. WE WOULD THEREFORE URGE THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ADVANCE POSITION BY NATO, WHICH WOULD OF ITS NATURE INVOLVE AN UNAVOIDABLE ELEMENT OF INFLEXIBILITY IF CARRIED OUT AT THIS STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS, NO CODIFICATION OF THE ENTIRE ISSUE OF EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION BE ATTEMPTED. WE WOULD SUGGEST RATHER THAT THE COMPONENT ASPECTS OF THE OVERALL ISSUE BE DELIBERATELY KEPT SEPARATE AS REGARDS THEIR PRESENT OR FUTURE TREATMENT IN NATO: (A) THE "FREEZE"; (B) THE PERIOD OF TIME BETWEEN PHASES; (C) THE QUESTION OF A SPECIFIC COMMITMENT IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT BY WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS TO PARTICIPATE IN A PHASE II

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AGREEMENT; AND, (D) THE STUDY OF WAYS ACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIES OF DEMONSTRATING TO THE EAST ABOVE AND BEYOND AN ALLIED COMMITMENT TO A COMMON CEILING AND TO PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II, THAT PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE A DEFINITIVE OUTCOME. THIS LAST COMPLEX INVOLVES QUESTIONS SUCH AS THE POSSIBLE DURATION OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT AND THE QUESTION OF HOW MUCH IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE I WOULD BE REQUIRED BY BOTH WEST AND EAST AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR BEGINNING AND FOR COMPLETING PHASE II. TRINKA

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** MILITARY EQUIPMENT, MILITARY PLANS, FORCE & TROOP LEVELS, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, NEGOTIATIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 19 MAR 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974VIENNA02458  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D740058-0147  
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**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
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**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t19740331/aaaabcvu.tel  
**Line Count:** 163  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** USNATO 1358  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 25 MAR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <25 MAR 2002 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <06 MAY 2002 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR: ASSURANCES ON EUROPEAN FORCE REDUCTIONS  
**TAGS:** PARM, NATO  
**To:** STATE DOD  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005